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PERVASIVE ISSUES IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AFFECTING
UNITED STATES AVIATION LAW AND POLICY
Russell E. Tanguay, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The airline industry is a booming global industry that continues to
evolve with advances in technology, growing consumer demand, and
continuing change in regulatory affairs. Regulations in the United
States and abroad affect domestic and international airlines. Various
regulations evolve in conjunction with the advances of the airline in-
dustry, while others do not. The following three issues have a long-
standing history within the airline industry: 1) antitrust immunity for
both domestic and foreign airlines and their alliance systems; 2) the
ownership of domestic airlines by foreign citizens; and 3) the inspec-
tion of foreign repair stations by United States ("U.S.") officials.
These three issues are hotly debated among members of Congress,
government departments, and actors in the airline industry. Legisla-
tion regarding these issues was also included in the most recent Fed-
eral Aviation Administration ("FAA") Reauthorization Act, which
attempt to alter current regulations.
In 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the FAA Re-
authorization Act ("The Act"). The Act authorized appropriations
for FAA programs for the years 2009 to 2012.1 The Senate passed its
own version of the Act that now must be reconciled with the House
version.2 Also included in the Act are past failed pieces of legislation
pertaining to these pervasive issues, which attempt to alter various as-
* Russell E. Tanguay, Jr. is a Juris Doctor candidate at DePaul University College of Law,
Chicago, expected December 2010. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree from The George
Washington University, Washington, D.C., in May 2006. He wishes to express his gratitude to
his father, Russell, for suggestions on drafts of this article.
1. FAA Reauthorization Act of 2009, H.R. 915, 111th Cong. §§ 101-05 (2009).
2. FAA Air Transportation Modernization and Safety Improvement Act, H.R. 1586, 111th
Cong. (2009).
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pects of airline regulation.3 The current Senate version of the bill re-
ceived consistent extensions because it is highly contested. 4
Under proposed legislation, three provisions5 are included that
would significantly alter current regulations. These provisions at-
tempt to change current regulations, laws, and processes that pres-
ently operate effectively and efficiently, and, therefore, should not be
altered. If these three provisions remain unchanged, these issues will
continue to resurface in the future and have a detrimental draining
effect on the airline industry.6 Further, some of these provisions
would not only affect the domestic airline market, but also diplomatic
relations between the U.S. and European Union ("EU") Member
States.
This Article will focus on the aforementioned three issues and pro-
vide general background information, discuss the relevant history of
each issue, and state the detrimental effects these issues could have on
the industry if altered. This article will also provide suggested solu-
tions for each issue. Part one of this Article discusses the significance
of aero-policy. Part two will provide general background of the 2009
FAA Reauthorization Act. Part three will discuss the first issue re-
garding antitrust immunity. Part four will discuss the second issue re-
garding foreign ownership of domestic airlines. The fifth part will
discuss the issue pertaining to foreign repair stations. Finally, part six
will provide a discussion on the future of aero-policy consistent with
these issues.
I. SIGNIFICANCE OF AERO-POLICY
The airline industry is unique because it permeates beyond U.S.
borders and into the global realm. Laws regulate airlines and affect
the ways in which they operate. This Article refers to government-
enacted policies for the airline industry as aero-policy. The world of
aero-policy is an interconnected web influenced by many different fac-
tors in addition to these laws, including agreements with other coun-
tries, government agencies, and airlines. The provisions contained
within the Act change current laws and policies, which in turn will
3. James Oberstar, Chairman, Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, Address at the Int'l Avia-
tion Club 5 (Mar. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Oberstar speech], available at http://www.iacwashington.
org/speeches/JamesOberstarlACspeechMar09.pdf.
4. Bartholomew Sullivan, Congress expected to vote today to extend FAA reauthorization bill,
postponing a decision on FedEx labor matter, THE COMM. APPEAL (July 29, 2010, 10:15 AM),
http://www.commnercialappeal.com/news/2010/jul/29/congress-expected-vote-today-extend-faa-
reauthoriz/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2010).
5. FAA Reauthorization Act of 2009, H.R. 915, 111th Cong., §§ 426, 303, 801.
6. See discussion infra sections III - V.
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alter airline business models, impact employees, and even impact dip-
lomatic relationships with foreign countries. Modifications at any
level create subtle ripple effects that affect the airline industry which
often go unnoticed to those unfamiliar with the airline industry.
Further, aero-policy affects American and foreign consumers. The
airline industry must be regulated to maintain current consumer de-
mands, and these demands are radically different from as little as ten
years ago.7 In 2005, 738 million consumers took to the skies on do-
mestic carriers, compared to 570 million in 1995 and 395 million in
1985.8 The FAA expects this number to surpass the one billion
threshold by 2015.9 In 2009, approximately 703 million passengers,
both domestic and international, landed on American soil.1o The
number of flights offered also increased with the number of passen-
gers - with 13 million flights in 2005, compared to 11.9 million in 1995
and 9.1 million in 1985.11 An example of aero-policy that affects con-
sumers and international regulations is the 2009 FAA Reauthorization
Act.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE 2009 FAA REAUTHORIZATION AcT
The Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") submitted its final cost
estimate to the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastruc-
ture for the Act on April 22, 2009.12 The $53.5 billion expenditure
appropriates the necessary funds for the FAA to operate effectively
and efficiently while meeting all safety regulations.'3 The CBO and
Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that implementing the Act
would increase discretionary spending by $44 billion, increase net di-
rect spending by $46 million, and reduce revenues by $14 million over
the 2009-2014 period.14 Other aspects of the Act include implement-
7. See FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, WHY CHANGE IS NEEDED (2008), available at
http://www.faa.gov/regulations-policies/reauthorization/change needed/.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS, PASSENGERS: ALL CARRIERS-ALL AIRPORTS
(2010), available at http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data Elements.aspx?Data=1 (The data table in-
cludes passenger data for the 2000-2009 time period obtained from the BOTS T100 Market data.
Although there is a decrease in total domestic and international passenger service between 2008
and 2009 from 809mm to 766mm, it is probably due to the global economic crisis).
11. FAA statistics, supra note 7.
12. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATION: H.R. 915 - FAA REAUTHORIZATION Acr or
2009 1 (Apr. 22, 2009) [hereinafter CBO], available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=
10096&sequence=0&from=6.
13. Id.; James L. Obsertar, House Approves FAA Reauthorization, http://oberstar.house.gov/
index.asp?Type=BPR&SEC={C2087AAD-CE9E-4667-9693-AC4708DA7204}&DE={904200E
A-8E15-448E-B912-0AB947C70E4C}.
14. CBO, supra note 12.
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ing a Next Generation ("Next Gen") Air Transportation System that
modernizes air traffic control, creates an independent Aviation Safety
Whistleblower Investigation Office within the FAA, funds runway im-
provement programs, hires additional aviation safety inspectors, and
requires that the FAA update flight-crew fatigue regulations.15 Fur-
ther, the Act proposes increasing the Passenger Facility Charge al-
lowed on all airfares from $4.50 to $7.00 per passenger per segment.16
These are only a few of the examples contained in the highly complex
piece of legislation.
III. ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
Section 426 of the Act's proposed language would sunset antitrust
immunity ("ATI") that the airlines and their alliances currently enjoy,
thus essentially terminating ATI.17 The Government Accountability
Office ("GAO"), which is the "investigative arm of Congress" and
"congressional watchdog,"' 8 is charged with conducting a study to re-
view the standards for granting ATI to domestic and foreign airlines.
ATI essentially creates an exception to U.S. antitrust laws, as it per-
mits the airlines to operate as if they were one company while still
maintaining individual businesses.' 9 Under current regulation, immu-
nity is granted to three major alliances: the Star Alliance, oneworld,
and SkyTeam.20
In order to receive ATI, the Department of Transportation
("DOT") must approve an application for ATI when it deems it is
"required by the public interest." 21 The DOT also considers whether
granting ATI is required to meet a substantial transportation need.22
However, as proposed, Section 42623 of the Act would permit current
ATI for airlines and their alliances to expire within three years.24
Consequently, the following detrimental effects would occur if ATI
was removed: 1) airline alliances and their business models would dis-
appear; 2) all airlines would have to reapply simultaneously for ATI,
leaving the airlines unorganized and searching for a new business
15. Oberstar website, supra note 13.
16. CBO, supra note 12, at 13.
17. FAA Reauthorization Act of 2009, H.R. 915, 111th Cong., § 426.
18. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/aboutlindex.html (last visited
Sept. 27, 2010).
19. CBO, supra note 12, at 16.
20. Oberstar speech, supra note 3, at 3.
21. 49 U.S.C. § 41308(b) (1994).
22. 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b)(1)(A) (1994).
23. FAA Reauthorization Act of 2009, H.R. 915, 111th Cong., § 426.
24. CBO, supra note 12, at 16; Oberstar speech, supra note 3, at 5-6.
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structure; 3) diplomatic relationships with the EU would deteriorate
due to EU concerns with being able to operate openly and freely in a
liberalized U.S.-EU market; and 4) the many options, features, and
benefits made available to consumers from the alliance system would
disappear.
A. Airlines and Their Business Models Would Disappear Through
the Termination of the Alliances as a Result of the
ATI Termination
Airlines create alliances to serve many purposes and structure their
business models and operations upon having these alliances. Airlines
and their alliance partners align their schedules, coordinate fares, and
provide larger global networks to customers around the world.25 Ad-
ditionally, airlines coordinate gate location and baggage handling
while offering a wider and more efficient network. 26 The proposed
legislation requires the GAO to review the current policies enacted
with respect to the granting of current ATI for airlines and their alli-
ances.27 From this review, the GAO would recommend policy
changes and new procedures to the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
and DOT. 2 8 Under the re-application process, the DOJ, DOT, and
the airlines would be required to adopt the updated and revised poli-
cies and procedures recommended by the GAO prior to ATI being
granted. 29 All of the business operations would change if Congress
enacted regulatory changes.
Representative James Oberstar of Minnesota referred to alliances
as a "de facto merger." 30 This is why he incorporated what was origi-
nally a separate piece of legislation, H.R. 831, which required the
GAO to conduct the aforementioned policy review of ATI grants, into
the current Act.31 The airlines, both domestic and foreign, are ex-
25. James Reitzes & Diana Moss, Airline Alliances and Systems Competition, 45 Hous. L.
REV. 293, 305 (2008) (This article provides a description of the origins of alliances and their
purposes. "Many networked and non-networked systems also display demand-side economies
or network effects. These economies occur when the value to any given user increases as addi-
tional users join the system. Apart from air transportation, network effects are evident in,
among other industries, telephony and software/hardware. For example, when an airline adds
service between its hub and a new location to accommodate passengers at that location, it also
creates new service offerings between that location and all other locations that can be reached
through its hub. ITis benefit, which is fundamental to hub-and-spoke airline networks, enhances
the value of the network for many other types of passengers.")
26. Id.
27. CBO, supra note 12, at 16.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Oberstar speech, supra note 3, at 3.
31. Id. at 5.
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tremely dependent upon the alliance system in order to provide their
services. Oberstar indicated that terminating ATI does not mean it is
the end for alliances, as the DOT could still grant ATI to the airlines
after they complete the re-application process and if they can prove
the alliance is beneficial to the public. 3 2 While Oberstar's proposition
suggests some opportunity for flexibility, this cannot negate the fact
that proponents of this provision encouraged what they deem "more
sound" antitrust policy.33 Of course, implementing "more sound" an-
titrust policy means stricter policies that result in making it more diffi-
cult for the airlines to qualify for ATI from the DOT. The suggestion
of flexibility is only a softened sell for the benefits of winning a vote.
The more sound antitrust policy ensures that customers "receive the
full benefits of a competitive marketplace;" 3 4 however, customers cur-
rently receive strong benefits from a competitive marketplace under
the current Act.
Oberstar also mentioned that the top three airlines in the U.S.-EU
market made up thirty-seven percent of all passengers in the market,
whereas, in 2007, the three major alliances made up eighty-five per-
cent of all passengers in that same market.35 There are eleven airlines
in the oneworld alliance,36 thirteen in the SkyTeam alliance,37 and
twenty-eight in the Star Alliance.38 Now that the DOT approved the
remaining ATI applications,39 Oberstar opined that the top three alli-
ances would control over ninety-five percent of the market in their
U.S.-European route pairings. 40 Alliances are not anticompetitive
and do provide the airlines' alleged benefits (e.g. lower fares). Com-
petition still exists among the alliances. While competition could exist
between forty-eight individual airlines, three major alliances could ef-
fectively operate more competitively because of utilization efficien-
cies, a result which ultimately benefits passengers.
The three major alliances collectively market themselves in order to
attract passengers to their member airlines and provide the lowest
32. Id. at 6-7.
33. Id. at 6; 155 CONG. REC. H5913-04, H5922 (daily ed. May 11, 2009) (statement of Rep.
Oberstar).
34. Id.
35. Oberstar speech, supra note 3, at 4.
36. ONEWORLD, http://www.oneworld.com (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
37. SKYTEAM, http://www.skyteam.com (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
38. STAR ALLIANCE, http://www.staralliance.com (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
39. The DOT recently approved the American Airlines-British Airways alliance application.
See Josh Mitchell and Daniel Michaels, U.S. Approves American, British Airways Alliance,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274 8704124
704575063743608164352.html.
40. Oberstar speech, supra note 3, at 4.
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possible fare on any given route pair. The airlines created these alli-
ances in order to align themselves, provide a larger network to their
customers, and ensure maximum capacity on each airline's planes.
Consumers benefit from the alliances because of the combined fre-
quent flyer programs, global markets, and lower fares resulting from
increased "passenger efficiency."
Further, the airlines' business models would cease to be interdepen-
dent upon each other. The lack in dependency would require each
airline to reassess its individual operations in all regards: airfares, gate
locations, baggage handling, city network options, and financial status.
An airline must determine the most innovative method to transport its
passengers to cities that it does not directly serve. If airlines have to
reconfigure their route maps, the process of applying to new cities
would be very cumbersome. In order to apply for this access, an air-
line must obtain a certificate of public convenience from the DOT,41 a
lengthy and time-consuming process due to overtaxed and inefficient
bureaucratic resources.
Revenues that were once derived from the coordinated selling of
seats on an alliance partner's airplane will no longer be a part of an
airline's profits. This depletion in revenue weakens the air carriers'
financial performance and competitive position.42 An airline must
create innovative ways to maximize its profits when it is not able to
rely on its partners to sell seats on its planes. Studies demonstrate
that the alliances provide more competitive fares than non-alliance
airlines.43 Airlines would be inclined to increase their fares in antici-
pation of any future loss if the alliances were dismantled.
Further, the entire ATI re-application process and subsequent alter-
ing of the airlines' business models would be ineffective and ineffi-
cient. This process could inflict millions of dollars in legal costs for the
airlines to ensure that the application meets all standards. Instead of
growing its business and ensuring it provides the most efficient net-
work, competitive prices, and options for its customers, an airline
would be preoccupied by this re-application process alone. This will
add costs, which would be passed to customers in the form of in-
creased fares. The process results in an irrational allocation of an air-
line's resources and is counter-productive in protecting consumer
interests. The airlines need to focus on how to maximize their profits,
especially since many airlines have suffered million and billion dollar
41. 41 U.S.C. § 41308(b) (1994); 41 U.S.C. § 41309(b)(1)(A) (1994).
42. 155 CONG. REc. H5913-04, H5920 (2009) (statement of Rep. Mica).
43. See Jan K. Brueckner & W. Tom Whalen, The Price Effects of International Airline Alli-
ances, 43 J. LAw & EcON. 503 (2000).
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quarterly and annual total losses.44 It does not make sense for the
government to impose stricter ATI requirements at this time, or in the
foreseeable future.
B. All Airlines Would Have to Reapply for ATI, Leaving the
Carriers with Much Uncertainty
The airlines would struggle with uncertainty once ATI sunsets and
the re-application process starts. The "more sound" policy that sup-
porters encouraged could result in stricter guidelines and in the DOT
granting airline ATI less frequently. The CBO even indicated that it is
unaware of what business practices and opportunities the airlines may
have to forgo with the new policy. 45
Furthermore, if alliance ATI ever sunsets, this uncertainty would
even exist for future re-application processes. There is no indication
as to whether or not the DOJ and DOT will revamp the ATI policies
every few years. This uncertainty again results in the airlines having
to re-apply for ATI every few years as well. The airlines' application
costs, as well as possible legal costs, could be overwhelming. It takes a
substantial amount of time and resources to ensure that all the airlines
are in compliance with the requirements and policies laid out for ATI
applications. Consequently, the process is excessive for businesses af-
fected by the DOJ and DOT policies to comply with such require-
ments. Moreover, it becomes burdensome for the airlines and their
upper-management to be up-to-date with all regulations on a constant
basis if those regulations continually change. Airlines model their
businesses around regulations. If these regulations change with each
re-application process, the airlines must constantly readjust their busi-
ness models to conform to these new policies and regulations.
Further, uncertainty leads the airlines into uncharted territory. This
territory leaves open the possibility that an airline could be denied
future ATI, essentially dissolving the alliance system for some, or even
the system in its entirety. The likelihood of a few airlines (versus the
many) surviving in an alliance would be greatly diminished; if not im-
possible. Airlines would have no confidence in their likelihood of
achieving future approvals, as the new rules would terminate present
ATI status every three years. Long term planning would be a thing of
the past. If the DOT denied one airline's application, this airline in
44. Harry R. Weber, Airlines Tell A Tale of 2 Camps - Profit v. Loss, Assoc. PRESs, Oct. 22,
2009, available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20091022/ap-on-bige/usearns_airlines (noting
that Delta suffered a $161 million loss, US Airways suffered an $80 million loss, and revenue fell
5.3% for JetBlue).
45. CBO, supra note 12, at 16.
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particular would operate alone and no longer enjoy the benefits of
streamlining reservations, route systems, and frequent flyer programs.
Moreover, once one airline falls out of an alliance system, its former
partners are likely to follow, because alliance airlines are dependent
upon one another. These concerns are too much for the airlines to
bear.
C. Terminating ATI is Inconsistent with the Global Market in
Respect to a U.S.-EU Open Skies Market
On May 25, 2007,46 the United States and twenty-seven European
Union Member States signed an Air Transport Agreement, otherwise
known as the U.S.-EU Open Skies Agreement ("Agreement"). 47 The
Agreement superseded all previous bilateral aviation agreements be-
tween the U.S. and the individual EU Member States.48 This Agree-
ment allowed for airlines from both regions to operate flights in a
more liberalized market with fewer restrictions. 49 Article 21 of the
first stage Agreement outlined the requirements for second stage ne-
gotiations,50 which occurred in March 2008 and March 2010.51 As a
result of second stage negotiations, both sides deleted Article 21 from
the Agreement. 52 According to Lawrence J. Kelly, "[t]his pro-growth,
pro-competition, pro-consumer [Algreement is a major breakthrough
in transatlantic economic relations."53 Inconsistencies with interna-
tional agreements, like this Agreement, lead to possible difficulties
operating in a free and open market, potential trade wars, and limita-
tions on airline traffic rights.
The proposed termination of current ATI for both domestic and
foreign airlines is problematic since EU carriers will cease to possess
the ATI classification that is essential in order to operate openly and
46. Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-EU, Apr. 30, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 134) 4 [hereinafter Air
Transport Agreement].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (Article 3 of the Treaty outlines the rights granted by both the U.S. and EU to each
other including the right to fly across their territories without landing, making non-traffic stops
in the country, and serve behind, intermediate, and beyond points in the territories).
50. Id.
51. James Kanter & Nicola Clark, U.S. and EU Agree to Expand Open Skies Accord, N.Y.
TIMES, March 26, 2010, at B3.
52. Protocol to Amend the Air Transport Agreement Between the United States of America
and the European Community and Its Member States, U.S.-EU, April 25 & 27, 2007, 2010 O.J.
(L 223) 3.
53. Lawrence J. Kelly, Is That "Whoosh" You Hear a New Whisper-Jet Whisking Across U.S.
Skies, or the Perotvian "Sucking-Sound" of Jobs Leaving the Country?: A Review of the Impact of
US-EU Open Skies Agreement Negotiations on the Leverage, Lifestyle, and Legal Standing of
U.S. Aviation Labor, 14 LAW & Bus. REv. AM. 699, 700 (2008).
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freely in a liberalized U.S.-EU market. The U.S. initially granted ATI
to foreign airlines in order for them to be able to enter into the Agree-
ment. Akin to domestic airlines, foreign airline business models
would have to transform if they are not granted ATI, because they
would no longer be able to coordinate schedules and integrate their
systems with the domestic airlines, which is especially important when
it concerns the transport of customers originating from foreign desti-
nations into cities within the U.S.
A second issue with the termination of current ATI for both domes-
tic and foreign airlines was the possibility of a trade war. This could
have occurred if the EU found U.S. policy to be inconsistent with the
Agreement in respect to ATI. This trade war would have encom-
passed further restrictions for the airlines. For example, if the EU had
retaliated by restricting or suspending traffic rights, then the U.S.
would have likely reciprocated. This constant struggle between the
U.S. and EU would have ultimately resulted in losses for the airlines
and, obviously, U.S. and EU citizens.
One example of plausible traffic right restrictions is the limitation of
cabotage rights.54 Cabotage rights include the importation and expor-
tation of goods to and from both regions. Any suspension could affect
this trade system and subsequently create a ripple effect across the
country. Any deviation by the U.S. from the forward moving direc-
tion would give the EU every right to renounce traffic rights. This
strains not just the airline industry, but diplomatic relationships be-
tween both regions as well. U.S. negotiators have been "more con-
cerned to threaten the Europeans with termination of the existing
flawed paradigm of 'open skies plus immunity." 55 These threats by
the U.S. are essentially a "catch-22," because if the U.S. revoked ATI
for foreign airlines, the EU would revoke traffic rights, which would
result in the domestic airlines losing significant access to the EU
market.
While it is extremely doubtful that these restrictions would, or
would have, ever reached the point of non-existent traffic rights (e.g.,
France restricting traffic from any U.S. airlines and vice versa), do-
mestic airlines would have experienced pressures from the restric-
tions. These pressures could have meant less profitable airlines, as the
airlines would have been restricted from flying into once lucrative cit-
ies. Furthermore, if the EU had restricted an airline from flying into a
54. Cabotage rights with respect to the airline industry allow foreign airlines to operate a leg
of its travel from two points from within the same region (e.g., United Airlines can fly from Los
Angeles to Sydney and on to Melbourne with the same plane and flight number).
55. Brian F. Havel, BEYOND OPEN SiEs: A NEw REGIME FOR INT'L AVIATION 301 (2009).
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city that the airline relies heavily upon to move its customers further
into the EU system with an EU alliance partner, it may have no
longer have been able to do so. This not only prohibits access to the
target city, but could also further deteriorate cooperation between the
two airlines; both would no longer have the capability to sustain the
present business relationships, and each airline would no longer con-
tinue to garner the benefits that alliances provide (i.e., profits and
larger global networks).
Antitrust immunity is generally recognized by the airlines as essen-
tial and required in order to complete any open skies agreement. 56
The U.S. is in negotiations with Japan to finalize an open skies agree-
ment, but Japan demands ATI for two of its airlines before it will
agree to the final terms.57 If the U.S. fails to grant ATI to airlines
without regard for the airlines' national affiliation, an airline in a for-
eign state would have leverage to threaten not to abide by the Agree-
ment. Essentially, all open skies agreements could disintegrate as a
result of a U.S. decision to either make ATI more stringent or poten-
tially eliminate it in its entirety.
D. Alliance Termination Precludes Consumers From Enjoying the
Many Options, Competitive Prices, and Services Made
Available to Them
Alliances offer more than just a broad global network; they also
coordinate reservations and ticketing processes, check-in, flight con-
nections, and baggage transfers.58 Alliances offer very similar perks
for personal and business travelers, including around-the-world pack-
age fares,59 access to airline lounges, 60 and centralized business solu-
tions for corporate travel and events.6 1 Without the granting of ATI,
56. John Hughes, Japan Requires Antitrust Immunity to Complete "Open Skies" Deal, BLOOM-
BERG (Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601101&sid=
asAQYqyinmTg.
57. Id.
58. Rod O'Connor, Alliances Bring Continents Even Closer, HEMISPHEREs 13 (Nov. 2009)
(giving detail on the new Star Alliance member, Continental Airlines, in an interview with
United's Senior Vice President of Alliances, Mark F. Schwab).
59. Round the World Fare, STAR ALLIANCE, http://www.staralliance.comlen/fares/round-the-
world-fare (last visited Apr. 3, 2010); see also Round-the-World Fares, ONEWORLD, http://www.
oneworld.com/ow/air-travel-options/round-the-world-fares (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
60. SkyTeam Lounges, SKYTEAM, http://www.skyteam.com/about/why/lounges.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 27, 2010); see also oneworld - Lounge Access, ONEWORLD, http://www.oneworld.com/
ow/ffp/lounge-access (last visited Sept. 27, 2010); see also Lounges - Star Alliance, STAR ALLI-
ANCE, http://www.staralliance.com/en/benefits/lounges/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
61. Business Solutions - Star Alliance, STAR ALLIANCE, http://www.staralliance.comlen/
business-solutions/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2010); see also Plan Global Meetings, SKYTEAM, http://
globalmeetings.skyteam.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2010). Services provided by the alliances in-
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services such as these would subside along with the alliance models,
eliminating these benefits in the short term and perhaps permanently.
United Airlines' Mark Schwab stated that Continental Airlines' re-
cent move from the SkyTeam Alliance to the Star Alliance created
many "efficiencies to help both [airlines] compete more effectively for
international traffic in an increasingly global air travel market." 62 An
especially business savvy move for both airlines includes the "Metal-
Neutral" network, which includes United, Continental, Lufthansa and
Air Canada.63 This pseudo-network allows these airlines to "pool rev-
enues while integrating their scheduling, inventory, management, pric-
ing, frequent flyer and sales activities on itineraries that include
transatlantic segments."64 This Network allows for better service and
significantly more competitive pricing to and from the European
market.65
Networks like the alliance programs and partnerships like the
"Metal-Neutral" program are only possible as a result of ATI. Al-
lowing the airlines to coordinate their businesses in a manner such as
this makes traveling seamless for the customer.66 Customers rely
heavily on the options that connect them from origin to destination. It
becomes disadvantageous to the customer if he or she must connect
the dots in his or her itinerary when airlines and their partners are
already capable of doing so for the customer (i.e., when a customer
must purchase separate itineraries on different airlines in order to
reach his final destination).
Individual airlines within alliances compete with other airlines and
alliances to offer the best possible price to and from every city route
pair. When airlines are capable of offering service to more cities, they
are able to offer competitive prices to attract customers onto their
planes. If the DOT lifts ATI, airlines would be forced to raise prices
and would be unable to partner with one another easily, if at all.
Since there would be fewer city options offered to the customer, an
airline would have to make up lost revenue in other places, because it
would be unable to rely on revenue from partner airlines and would
be limited in its service. One way the airlines would try to make up
lost revenue would be to offer higher fares on their traditional routes.
clude coordinating corporate travel reservations and planning corporate conventions and global
meetings.
62. O'Connor, supra note 58, at 14.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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The DOT grants ATI to allow airlines to create alliances. Critics
argue alliances are contrary to antitrust policy and fail to provide the
many benefits that are presumed when granting immunity; however,
one study suggests that fares are actually lower when dealing with al-
lied partners as compared to non-allied partners. 67 Further, increased
service availability means additional competition. When more airlines
compete in a particular route pair, more competition exists to attract
customers and fill their planes to capacity. Airlines would try to lower
their prices to attract the most customers. For example, airfares
would be significantly lower if ten airlines offered service between
New York and Chicago, since an airline would have a lower
probability of attracting customers if it offered a higher airfare com-
pared to its nine competitors. Additionally, the lack of service on any
alliance or airline increases the likelihood that a customer would
switch to a competitor that offers service to the customer's final desti-
nation. Not only does the customer suffer due to higher prices and
lack of service, but the alliances and airlines see the reciprocal effect
of customers giving business to their competitors as well. Customers
deserve to enjoy the options, competitive prices, and services made
available to them by the alliance systems.
E. Possible Solutions for ATI
It is unnecessary to sunset ATI for all airlines and require them to
reapply for ATI. The DOT and DOJ should conduct a review of the
current situation and determine if there is anything significantly an-
ticompetitive about the airlines' and alliances' current business prac-
tices. Anticompetitive effects could result from price-fixing, collusion
amongst the airlines, or predatory pricing - three issues at the heart of
U.S. antitrust regulations.68 The purpose of the Sherman Antitrust
Act is to prohibit these anticompetitive practices in order to prevent a
restraint on trade and encourage competition.69 Visible anticompeti-
tive effects are generally in existence in the airline industry; however,
the benefits of the alliances outweigh the alleged anticompetitive ef-
fects. Greater amounts of features and benefits, as well as less costly
airfares for customers, are significant advantages for the American
consumer.
Even though Oberstar referred to alliances as a "de facto"
merger,70 alliances are the closest form of a "global" airline that the
67. Brueckner & Whalen, supra note 43.
68. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004).
69. Id.
70. Oberstar speech, supra note 3, at 3.
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U.S. is willing to entertain at the present time. An opportunity exists
for the U.S. to collaborate with foreign states to create a true global
airline. Alliances provide similar, if not the same, benefits that con-
sumers would receive from an actual global airline. The U.S. should
move in the direction of liberally granting antitrust immunity to per-
mit alliances to operate, or create an actual global airline that would
provide benefits similar to the alliances. While the alliances currently
operate under ATI immunity, the creation of a global airline is years
away.
Further, Congress should not include legislation pertaining to ATI
in a proposed bill as complex as an FAA Reauthorization Act. Anti-
trust immunity is extremely complex by itself. Including ATI as a
small portion of a vast sea of legislation is highly irresponsible on the
House's part. The review of ATI regulations should encompass a bi-
partisan committee from the House of Representatives and Senate, as
well as the DOT and FAA. Congress should also conduct an analysis
of the anticompetitive effects and genuine benefits from the currently
immune airlines and alliances. The bipartisan committee should try to
discover a way to balance liberal and conservative proposals of ATI
practices. Under the proposed legislation, ATI would essentially
cease to exist. Rather than lift ATI altogether, a revamped policy
should, at a minimum, include fair and straightforward regulations
that would still allow the airlines to continue to conduct business
under the current alliance systems.
IV. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF U.S. AIRLINE CARRIERS
Section 801 of H.R. 915 contains language that requires U.S. airline
carriers to be under the actual control of U.S. citizens.7' U.S. citizens
must make all decisions with respect to the "marketing, branding,
fleet composition, route selection, pricing, and labor relations." 72 This
is problematic because EU Member States could view this policy as
contradictory to the fact that the U.S. prefers to have open skies
agreements with other countries. Furthermore, disallowing foreign
ownership precludes any foreign citizens from occupying upper- and
middle-management roles within domestic airlines. This cuts off the
possibility of having the best and brightest employees in administra-
tive positions making the best possible decisions and creating effective
solutions to problems affecting the airlines. Precluding foreign owner-
ship also prevents domestic carriers from accessing global capital.
71. FAA Reauthorization Act of 2009, H.R. 915, 111th Cong. § 801 (2009).
72. Id.
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A. Further Limitations on Foreign Ownership is Contradictory
to a Globalized Market
The EU and U.S. are both interested in creating a more liberalized
and globalized market for the airline industry.73 Implementing fur-
ther limitations to foreign ownership is contradictory to the creation
of a more global airline market. In order for the Open Skies Agree-
ment to flourish and be most effective, the U.S. must be consistent
with its aviation policies. Current U.S. policy allows foreign investors
to control, at a maximum, twenty-five percent of the equity in an air-
line, but allows a higher percentage of non-voting equity.74 If Con-
gress enacted statutory language that implemented further limitations
on foreign investment, then it would be implementing policy contra-
dictory to current and future agreements between the U.S. and EU.
Foreign investment is a fundamental aspect of a globalized market.
If the U.S. failed to relax its limitations and instead enacted further
limitations, the EU could have countered with its own restrictions if it
was unsatisfied with the terms of the Agreement. This result could
have been a catalyst for a trade war and renouncement of traffic
rights.75 In order for the U.S., EU, and other regions of the world to
experience a truly global market, every participating country or region
must make exceptions.
An open skies market requires more than granting liberal traffic
rights to foreign countries within their own borders - it must relax its
foreign ownership restrictions. It is likely that the U.S. will eventually
relax restrictions while reducing concerns that domestic airlines will
succumb to foreign control. Traditional U.S. airlines would still be
considered domestic airlines even if any of them are majority-con-
trolled by foreign investors. The U.S. would still require foreign in-
vestors to make decisions for the U.S.-based airline that are consistent
with domestic law and policy.
An airline would be considered under the "actual control" of U.S.
citizens "[s]o long as U.S. citizens retain the authority to make final
decisions on all matters pertaining to the business and the structure of
the carrier."76 There is no significant difference between a U.S. citi-
zen and a foreign citizen making a final decision affecting the airline's
business model and structure so long as decisions by foreign citizens
73. Air Transport Agreement, supra note 46.
74. Jessica Finan, A New Flight in the International Aviation Industry: The Implications of the
United States-European Union Open Skies Agreement, 17 TUL. J. Iwr'L & COMP. L. 225, 239
(2008).
75. See discussion supra section III regarding the detrimental impact of sunsetting ATI.
76. Oberstar speech, supra note 3, at 10.
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are discussed and consistent with current U.S. policy. Additionally, it
would be appropriate to validate decisions made by foreign employ-
ees. Not only would this validation requirement relax U.S. trepidation
of foreign influence and takeover, it also would be policy consistent
with achieving a true open skies globalized market.
B. Disallowing Foreign Ownership Limits Airlines From
Selecting Quality Employees
U.S. policy that requires domestic airlines to be under the "actual
control" of American citizens limits the airlines' capacity to employ
individuals at their discretion.77 This limitation prevents airlines from
employing people that they consider to be the greatest asset to airline
management and most trustworthy in making pertinent decisions with
respect to the business. Disallowing foreign ownership potentially
precludes any foreign employees from occupying the upper and mid-
dle-management roles of an airline and cuts off the capacity for the
airline to have the best and brightest employees making the airlines'
most significant decisions.
Representative Oberstar claimed that Section 801 permits airlines
to hire any foreign employee, in both middle- and upper-management
roles, only if the individuals making the final business decisions are
U.S. citizens.78 This statement does not comprehend that airlines
would not put forth the effort to even consider hiring foreign citizens
if these individuals would have no authority to make any decisions for
the company. This provision essentially limits the airlines from hiring
particular individuals. Furthermore, it prevents the airlines access to a
wider range of potential management personnel.
Permitting foreign citizens to hold middle- and upper-management
roles is also a positive move for domestic airlines. Introducing new
business methods and ideas gleaned from foreign influences allows the
domestic airlines to evolve and discover new methods in a competi-
tive, and struggling, industry. Allowing foreign citizens to act as deci-
sion-making personnel is the perfect first step in being able to
profitably evolve.
Allowing foreign citizens to hold these positions would not preclude
U.S. citizens from obtaining these positions. Qualified individuals
making decisions for billion dollar airline corporations are far few and
77. Fman, supra note 74.
78. Oberstar speech, supra note 3, at 10 (Oberstar stated that "[t]he provision does not pre-
vent a U.S. airline from employing foreign citizens, including middle and upper management, in
any area of operations so long as U.S. citizens retain the authority to make final decisions on all
matters pertaining to the business and the structure of the carrier.").
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far between. This is a very specialized position, and thousands of U.S.
citizens are not competing for middle- and upper-management airline
positions. Since the applicant pool is by no means teeming, the U.S.
government would be doing a disservice to its domestic corporations if
it ever implemented further limitations on foreign investment.
C. U.S. Access to Global Capital Through Foreign
Establishment Rights
Preventing foreign ownership also prohibits U.S. access to global
capital through foreign establishment rights. The current nationality
clause restricts foreign companies from establishing subsidiaries in the
U.S. air carrier market and taking advantage of American consumer
spending.79 The nationality clause is present in all multilateral agree-
ments between the U.S. and its foreign counterparts.s0 It also rules
out the possibility of mergers and acquisitions across borders between
separate nations.8' Economists refer to such a nationality clause as
"output-restricting."8 2 "It has trapped the air[line] industry inside an
impenetrable commercial bubble, unable to provide services ... with
the operation and structural flexibility that is automatically assumed
in virtually all other major industries and services."83 "[T]he United
States makes waiver determinations based on whether a change in the
ownership/control composition of a foreign airline affects [U.S.] avia-
tion policy or interests (it typically will not)."8 If the Act makes for-
eign establishment restrictions even stricter, it would solidify the
impossibility of the nationality clause ever being waived by the U.S.
To some, airline alliances are merely "artificial" mergers between
the airlines, as the nationality clause incapacitates the airlines from
engaging in such a practice.85 The U.S. could benefit in many ways if
it permitted establishment rights to foreign companies and granted the
79. Brian F. Havel, White Paper: A New Approach to Foreign Ownership of National Airlines,
at 15 (copy available with author) (Havel states that the nationality clause is still in place "even
though many airlines are no longer state-owned, which in the past created concerns that they
were kept aloft unfairly by the public treasury and not because of any commercial acumen.
Some privatized carriers are actually approaching the point where homeland nationals hold only
a bare majority of shares. In this context, the nationality restriction imposes the additional bur-
den of monitoring and turning back any threat of rising foreign dominance, even if the foreign-
owned shareholdings are diffuse and deeply fragmented.").
80. Mariko Sanchanta, U.S. Airlines Step Up JAL Lobbying, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2009, at B2.
81. Havel White Paper, supra note 79, at 16.
82. Id. at 15.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 13 (citing Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States, the European Union and the
Ownership and Control of Airlines, ISSUES IN Av. L. & POL'Y (CCH), 1 25,151, 13, 172 (2003).
85. Id. at 17.
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EU access to the gigantic U.S. domestic market. Policy contrary to
this is only detrimental for the U.S. Similar to foreign investment,
access to global capital could only rejuvenate U.S. and foreign econo-
mies. The possibility always exists for the U.S. to garner benefits from
profits derived from foreign subsidiaries. It also means more competi-
tors in the marketplace, resulting in cost and feature benefits to the
consumer.
The Director of External Affairs and Route Development for Vir-
gin Atlantic Airways, Barry Humphreys, in 2003 asked: "[w]hat is so
special about air transport that it requires to be treated so differently
from most other businesses?" 86 This was in reference to the restric-
tions set forth by the U.S. concerning airlines while so many other
businesses are set up within U.S. borders and backed by foreign inves-
tors. Humphreys provided a strong example that the Virgin Group
invests in American retail stores, cellular services, ground transporta-
tion, and other business outlets, yet the corporation faces much more
scrutiny when it wants to set up an airline on U.S. soil.87 As the air-
line industry is treated differently, the U.S. airline industry is re-
stricted from access to any type of global capital that could normally
enter the U.S. economy.
D. Solutions
Potential legislation attempts to make foreign ownership of U.S.
carriers more stringent. If anything, a practical solution that harmo-
nizes with a more liberal market would be to either increase the for-
eign ownership percentage, or to scrap the requirement altogether.
The DOT and DOJ could still scrutinize airlines just as before, not-
withstanding if the airlines are under domestic or foreign control. As
one scholar suggests, the scrapping the foreign ownership percentage
requirement is highly recommended since, "the benefits [of scrapping
the provision] . . . appear to far outweigh the losses."88
The U.S. should relax its foreign ownership restrictions in the fu-
ture.89 As noted, the U.S. could require all individuals with decision-
making power to make decisions for the airlines consistent with U.S.
86. Barry Humphreys, Dir. of External Affairs and Route Dev., Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ad-
dress, Liberalised Airline Ownership and Control, Seminar Prior to the ICAO Worldwide Air
Transport Conference: Challenges and Opportunities of Liberalization (Mar. 22 & 23, 2003).
87. Id.
88. Bimal Patel, A Flight Plan Towards Financial Stability - The History and Future of Foreign
Ownership Restrictions in the United States Aviation Industry, 73 J. AIR L. AND COM. 487, 524
(2008).
89. Madhu Unnikrishnan, Negotiators See Need To Step Up Open-Skies Talks, AVIATION
DAILY, Oct. 12, 2009.
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law regardless of citizenship affiliation. All aspects of the airline in-
dustry, including security and labor, would be regulated by U.S. law.
The airline industry is completely different from what it was even ten
years ago. This is an opportunity for the U.S. to cease its normal prac-
tices with respect to nationality restrictions and be innovative with its
domestic and global airline markets.90 As times change, the industry
should continue to strive to be more efficiently competitive, and the
laws and restrictions should be a motivator to do so, with customers
reaping the benefits.
V. INSPECTIONS OF FOREIGN REPAIR STATIONS BY U.S. OFFICIALS
The U.S. first promulgated regulations for foreign repair stations in
1949, when domestic airlines began flying international routes.9' Sec-
tion 303 of the Act's proposed legislation requires inspection of the
325 certified foreign repair stations across the EU twice per year by
FAA officials. 92 Foreign repair stations are facilities certified by the
FAA to perform various tasks, including maintenance, repairs, over-
hauls, or alterations on a domestic aircraft and its components.93 Sec-
tion 303 also requires drug and alcohol testing for individuals
conducting safety reviews and repairs at such stations.94 Further, the
repair stations are regulated by the Federal Aviation Regulations,
90. Matt Vella, Lift U.S. Airlines Via Foreign Ownership: Overseas carriers should be permitted
to buy U.S. airlines in full. Pro or con?, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 28, 2008 (Vella's commentary
stated that "[f]oreign ownership of U.S. strategic assets is a debate-worth topic, but our domestic
airlines have long ceased to fall into the 'strategic' category. Instead, they have degenerated into
an embarrassment of tortured inefficiency. Greater overseas ownership-and the ebullience
that relaxing of current rules would bring with it-would give the U.S. airline industry a second
wind, full of market-based incentives to innovate.").
91. Guy S. Gardner, Assoc. Adm'r for Regulation and Certification, FAA, Statement Before
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp. (May 7, 1998), available at http://
testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/98test/Gardnerl.htm. Gardner further stated that the pur-
pose behind repair stations was to provide U.S. carriers and operators of U.S.-registered aircraft
with an avenue for obtaining maintenance outside U.S. territory. Any aircraft that required
work outside of U.S. territory would receive maintenance at these facilities and this maintenance
work required an exemption issued by the FAA.
92. FAA Reauthorization Act of 2009, H.R. 915, 111th Cong. § 303 (2009); see also Cindy
Farkus, Assistant Adm'r, Office of Global Strategies, Statement Before the Subcomm. on
Transp. Sec. and Infrastructure Protection (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://www.tsa.gov/assets/
pdf/111809_repair stations.pdf (Farkus notes that there are 712 repair stations certificated by the
FAA globally, and two-thirds of the repair stations are located in the EU alone); 2009 FAA
Reauthorization Act, H.R 915, 111th Cong., § 303.
93. Farkus speech, supra note 92. Farkus further explains that components consist of "en-
gines, hydraulics, avionics, safety equipment, airframes, or interiors."
94. Id.
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which provide that these facilities are responsible for the airworthi-
ness of the airplanes they inspect.9 5
Inspection reciprocity is up for consideration. Without a reciprocity
agreement between the EU and U.S., the EU states, by law, must also
conduct independent inspections of the repair stations themselves.
These inspections are costly, burdensome, and strewn with inefficien-
cies. However, reciprocity means that Americans could face job
losses, and reciprocity could harm small businesses. Representative
Oberstar claimed that these concerns of "[a]larmism [are] premature
and speculative at best;" however, they are nonetheless true. 96 This
section of the Article discusses this more in depth the reciprocal bur-
den on the EU, potential job loss for Americans, and the burden for
the FAA and DOT.
A. Foreign Repair Stations Have a Proven Positive Safety Record
It can be argued that current safety regulations are sufficient con-
sidering the low accident rate among U.S. airlines. As a common
practice, airlines contract with repair stations both domestically and
abroad, and the airlines rely heavily upon these stations to indepen-
dently conduct safety inspections. 97 No significant safety issues have
surfaced under current regulations; therefore, there is no need to alter
current regulations with respect to foreign repair stations.
Some of the incentives for contracting with independent repair sta-
tions include the "optimization of flight schedules around customer
demand instead of maintenance infrastructure availability" and "ex-
ceptional quality at a reduced cost." 98 The industry's reliance on con-
tracted repair stations has significantly increased since 2001,99 and
during this time the accident rate decreased exponentially. 00 Less
95. Responsibility for Airworthiness, 14 C.F.R. § 121.363 (2010) (the regulation for the "re-
sponsibility for airworthiness" provides: (a) Each certificate holder is primarily responsible for-
(1) The airworthiness of its aircraft, including airframes, aircraft engines, propellers, appliances,
and parts thereof; and (2) The performance of the maintenance, preventive maintenance, and
alteration of its aircraft, including airframes, aircraft engines, propellers, appliances, emergency
equipment, and parts thereof, in accordance with its manual and the regulations of this chapter.
(b) A certificate holder may make arrangements with another person for the performance of any
maintenance, preventive maintenance, or alterations. However, this does not relieve the certifi-
cate holder of the responsibility specified in paragraph (a) of this section.).
96. Oberstar speech, supra note 3, at 9.
97. Statement of Basil J. Barimo, Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. and Infrastructure Protection of
the House Homeland Sec. Comm. (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://www.airlines.orgPublic
Policy/Testimony/Pages/testimony_11-18-09House.aspx.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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than .5 fatal accidents per one million scheduled departures occurred
since deregulation of the airline industry.' 0 Airlines put forth safety
regulations as their number one priority, because they fear the loss of
business from both loyal and transient customers as a result of safety
violations and accidents.
B. EU Member States Could Demand Reciprocity of Inspecting
U.S. Repair Stations, Which Is Impossible for the EU Because It
Lacks Sufficient Numbers in Personnel and Financials
The EU is not hesitant to retaliate against the U.S. when laws and
requirements are enacted that are inconsistent with agreements relat-
ing to a more liberalized airline market. One retaliatory measure in-
volves demanding the reciprocity of two annual inspections of repair
stations located in the U.S. and certified by the European Aviation
Safety Agency ("EASA").102 The EU already commenced prelimi-
nary steps to institute such retaliatory measures. The Director for En-
ergy and Transport, a division of the European Commission ("EC"),
initiated the preliminary stages in response to the language set forth in
the Reauthorization Act. He stated that "Europe needs to have ur-
gently a set of draft measures which can be quickly put in place to
ensure that, if the US legislation obliges the US administration to pro-
ceed twice yearly with inspections which cannot be delegated to its
contractual partners, we will be reciprocating in full."10 3 The Agency
has every right to enact such mandatory inspections twice per year.104
The Director, Daniel Calleja, also requested the financial and human
resources information necessary to impose such requirements. 05
In a response to Calleja's letter, the Executive Director of the
EASA agreed with him that the EU would react in a "reciprocal man-
ner. "106 The procedure to determine an efficient changeover from
U.S. to EU inspectors would include identifying the locations of
EASA-approved stations, the number of staff required for the inspec-
tions, the number of local offices needed in the U.S., the cost for each,
101. Id. at 3.
102. Letter from Daniel Calleja, European Comm'n Dir. for Energy and Transp., to M. Pat-
rick Goudou, EASA Executive Director (June 5, 2009) (on file with author), available at http://
www.pmamarpa.com/pdfl2009-06-05CallejaRepairStationAuditPlanRequest.pdf; EUROPEAN
AvIATION SAFETY AGENCY, http://www.easa.eu.int (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Letter from Patrick Goudou, EASA Executive Dir., to Daniel Calleja, EC Dir. for En-
ergy and Transp. (June 22, 2009), available at http://www.pmamarpa.com/pdfl2009-06-22EASA
RepairStationAuditProposal.pdf.
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and the determination of a possible change in regulatory fees for each
EASA certified station. 07 In an August 19, 2009, letter to all EASA-
certified repair stations in the U.S., the EASA outlined the new pro-
cedures and requested information from each station. 08 The EASA
informed the organizations that new regulations would be put in place
if the U.S. enacted additional inspections requirements that were not
originally part of the Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements
("BASA").109 The domestic repair stations would be required to
reapply for EASA certification and higher certification fees would be
put in place based upon the number of employees at the station.1 0
There is a concern that requirements such as these impose a burden
upon the EU due to a lack of personnel available to keep in stride
with such standards if the EU were to require reciprocal inspec-
tions."' Compared to the 1,237 repair stations located in the U.S.,112
the requirement to inspect 325 repair stations in the EU is burden-
some."13 The burden is highly disproportionate for the EU, because
three times the number of repair stations exist in the U.S. as com-
pared to the EU. The U.S. inspection requirements create a high de-
gree of unfairness, essentially prohibiting the EU from enacting
similarly stringent requirements if the U.S. ever decided to do so.
C. Americans Face Potential Job Loss, and Requirements Harm
Small U.S. Businesses
If the EU implements the reciprocal policy of engaging in biannual
inspections of repair stations, many Americans may face potential job
loss1 14 in addition to the effects businesses" 5 would face when dealing
directly with the repair stations. Americans would face potential job
loss in two manners: 1) EASA not granting certification for tradition-
ally certificated repair stations;116 and 2) EU personnel conducting in-
spections instead of U.S. personnel."17
107. Id.
108. Letter from Wilfried Schulze, EASA Head of Organisations Dept., to U.S. EASA Certi-
fied Repair Stations (August 19, 2009) (on file with author).
109. Id.
110. 155 CONG. REc. H5913-04, H5919 (daily ed. May 11, 2009).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Goudou letter, supra note 106.
114. 155 CONG. REc. H5913-04, H5919 (daily ed. May 11, 2009).
115. Id.
116. H.R. 915, 111th Cong. § 303 (2009), available at 2009 WL 1337483, (statement of Thomas
E. Zoeller: Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. On House Transp. and
Infrastructure).
117. Schulze letter, supra note 108.
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If a U.S. repair station does not receive its recertification from the
EASA, the station would not have further need for individuals to con-
duct inspections. The EASA would not certify stations for American
inspectors; only for EU inspectors. The U.S. cannot bear any more
job losses given the state of the economy. If the U.S. were to enact
more costly requirements on foreign service stations, with repair, in-
spection, and part services, the U.S. would reduce workforce to adjust
the loss of business lines. Furthermore, a business would reevaluate
its business model to recoup lost revenue. If a repair station does re-
ceive certification, EU officials would replace U.S. officials and ac-
quire their responsibility. This is one way the EU would phase out the
U.S. workforce in retaliation for policies set forth by the U.S.
Whether or not a domestic repair station is granted recertification,
Americans would lose their jobs in either event.
Small aviation supply businesses in the U.S. could also be harmed
by the new requirements. 8 Similar to service station employees, the
need for these businesses would no longer exist, and it would make it
difficult for the business to survive. Also, legislation "would prevent a
manufacturer from either rebuilding a part under its current authority
or repairing a part it manufactured as a subcontractor to a repair sta-
tion or air carrier."1 19 These small companies are losing business as a
result of repair stations becoming essentially unnecessary. In essence,
the effect of these inspections create a giant ripple effect for employ-
ees and businesses, as it seems everyone and everything will be losing
something, whether it is a job, profits, or customers.
D. Requirements Are Extremely Burdensome on and Inefficient
for the FAA and EU
Much of the FAA Reauthorization Act is complex. However, pro-
visions involving such items as the foreign repair station inspections
fail to make the cut. The requirement that all 325 foreign repair sta-
tions be inspected twice per year by FAA personnel is overly burden-
some, extremely costly, and inefficient. The reality of these two
annual inspections is unlikely and financially detrimental.
Representative Oberstar, in a speech to the International Aviation
Club, stated that "[s]urely they can find enough bodies in this 215,000-
person Department to do this job."120 This implies that the DOT
would have to engage in some type of labor shift by reviewing its em-
118. 155 CONG. REc. H5913-04, H5919 (daily ed. May 11, 2009).
119. Id.
120. Oberstar speech, supra note 3, at 8.
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ployee breakdown in order to determine who in its entire agency
would be responsible for making these two inspections per year.
From a labor standpoint, it is inefficient for the Department to reallo-
cate its employees to determine the individuals responsible for these
inspections.
Thomas Zoeller, President and CEO of the National Air Carrier
Association, stated his many concerns with the language for legisla-
tion of this type. He notes that certification of each foreign repair
station is not indefinite.121 Since the certification process would ex-
pire every two years, the stations would have to reapply for certifica-
tion every two years, and each station is responsible for its own costs
in the application process. 122 The U.S. should not be instituting re-
quirements on the EU member states that pertain to efficiency and
financials. Procedures enacted that require the twice per year inspec-
tion of foreign repair stations are redundant. Furthermore, similar to
the ATI re-application process, the repair stations would never have a
guarantee of certification in the inspections.
Reciprocity creates increased costs for the EU on top of the recer-
tification process every two years. If the EU were granted its reci-
procity wish in return for the FAA inspection requirement, the costs
for each U.S.-based repair station would increase from $960 to $32,100
per station per year123 for each of the 1,237 certified domestic repair
stations.124 Zoeller fears that this would mean U.S.-based stations
would lose their EU certification due to the lack of EU personnel
available to make the inspections, and Americans would be side-
lined.125 Furthermore, since the EU would have insufficient person-
nel to conduct the biannual inspections, some stations would no
longer be able to inspect EU aircraft, which would result in monetary
damage to the station itself with regard to customer airlines that re-
quire both U.S. and EU certification. 12 6 An increase in costs for the
EU and the U.S. would be a step in the wrong direction. An addi-
tional reallocation of approximately $31,000 per U.S. station for EU
members would be required. Proposed requirements that change the
current structure of the certification of both foreign and domestic re-
pair stations are irresponsible, especially when one considers the suc-
cess of the current system.
121. Zoeller statement, supra note 116.
122. Id.
123. Zoeller statement, supra note 116; see also 155 CONG. REc. H5913-04, H5919 (daily ed.
May 11, 2009).
124. 155 CONG. REc. H5913-04, H5919 (daily ed. May 11, 2009).
125. Zoeller statement, supra note 116.
126. 155 CONG. REc. H5913-04, H5919 (daily ed. May 11, 2009).
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Proponents of this provision argue that it is a matter of public
safety. "Opponents of Section 303 also claim that requiring two FAA
inspections per year will cause the EU to retaliate by conducting re-
ciprocal twice-a-year inspections of EASA-certified U.S. stations. But
this is a matter of public safety."' 27 Further, the obligation for ensur-
ing public safety far outweighs foreign countries' attempts to protect
their own economic interests.128 While no American would contest
the priority of maintained and improved safety on airlines in a post-9/
11 society, arguing that inspections are at risk is uncalled for consider-
ing the safety record. The argument seeks to scare opponents by mix-
ing in an implied threat without any actual public danger.
E. Solutions
The current structure of foreign repair station inspections is sound.
An overzealous approach of incorporating more stringent U.S. proce-
dures and involvement is unrealistic and extremely costly. As an al-
ternative, the DOT could audit the safety measures taken by the
current inspectors to determine if these foreign inspectors are meeting
U.S. safety standards. If the DOT does not conduct an audit, then the
DOT can step in and impose a more specific and thorough standard
with U.S. officials and inspectors.
Current policy changes have been proposed with respect to the
Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") that promote "the
security of both domestic and foreign aircraft stations as required by
the Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, P.L. 108-
176."129 The proposed regulations aim to preclude any unauthorized
access to repair stations in order to prevent sabotage, destruction, or
theft of aircraft or its components. 30 In creating these policy changes,
the TSA developed relationships with its foreign counterparts to de-
velop international safety requirements. 13 ' The FAA should repeat
the steps taken by the TSA to create an international relationship and
dialogue.
While this relationship may in fact exist, the FAA needs to reevalu-
ate its relationships with the EU and its foreign repair stations.
Rather than overhaul foreign repair stations purely with U.S. person-
nel, the U.S. should implement or continue policy that requires for-
eign repair stations to correct issues when they are non-compliant.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Farkus speech, supra note 93.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2.
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For instance, the TSA would notify the FAA if a foreign repair station
failed to correct its deficiencies in order for the FAA to suspend the
station's certification.13 2 The same actions should follow for stations
that fail to comply with regulations or correct deficiencies that pertain
to aircraft maintenance. Disciplinary action should be uniform across
all foreign repair stations, whether a security issue, procedural or ac-
tual substandard maintenance of aircraft. If a breach in compliance
were found, the FAA could suspend a station's certification until open
issues are resolved.
VI. WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR AERO-POLICY
The futures of all proposed Reauthorization Acts are uncertain. It
is unlikely the Senate will pass H.R. 915 without changes. President
Obama presented his budget for the 2011 fiscal year that omitted
some of the current legislation in H.R. 915 that falls outside the scope
of these three pervasive issues-sunsetting ATI, foreign ownership of
U.S. airlines, and inspecting foreign repair stations. 33 Both arms of
Congress must meet in order to reach a compromise.134
The outcome of these three issues is uncertain. The airline industry,
like any other industry, continues to evolve with its counterparts as
technology, business practices, and consumer initiatives become more
innovative. The key behind successful U.S. regulation is to enact poli-
cies that provide an opportunity to innovate. Nationalistic approaches
will either lead to a failure in U.S. policies or result in sub-optimal
situations for U.S. officials, businesses, consumers, and colleagues
abroad. Hopefully at some point in the future these three issues will
become moot - essentially terminating the need for debate while pro-
viding the airline industry with the most favorable situation possible.
An optimal solution to these issues should translate to lower costs,
increased features, and benefits for the consumer.
CONCLUSION
The three issues discussed either need not be altered; or if one or
more are, policy should allow the airlines to flourish and operate as
successful corporations. Although there is always need for focus on
improvement and advancement, these three issues should not be al-
132. Id.
133. For a more exhaustive review of the Obama 2011 fiscal year budget, please visit http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Overview/.
134. Glenn Pew, FAA Reauthorization And Rule Changes To See Debate in March, AVWEB
(Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/FAAreauthroization billsafety_
changes-senate march_202005-1.html?type=pf.
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tered. As times progress, so will the airline industry and U.S. policy.
U.S. policy must evolve with the challenges and be consistent with the
best solutions in order for the airline industry to thrive domestically
and globally. While no situation will ever leave all parties satisfied,
these solutions and the supporting reasoning and explanations are the
most beneficial at the present time.

